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Abstract 
Scientific study has revealed that man-made greenhouse gas emissions are causing global 
warming. A milestone of international e ffort for combating global warming was the 
establishment of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in 1997. The Protocol sets out a 5% emission reduction target from 1990 
level for Annex I region in 2010. 
Economic research has foreseen that it will be very costly for some industrial countries to 
comply the target individually and therefore suggested international co-operation through 
flexible mechanisms - Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development 
Mechanism. Because main greenhouse gases have the uniform-mixing feature, the use of 
the flexible mechanisms could be both environmentally and economically effective. 
Recently emerged a number of theoretical and empirical studies to explore the economics 
of the mechanisms. This paper is intended to survey the existing research results with the 
mechanisms, including conceptual clarifications, cost and benefit analysis, potential 
problems, empirical findings, and perspectives for future research. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Global warming has become a noticeable phenomenon of climate change during recent 
decades. Since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provided scientific 
data on temperature increase, affecting forces, and potential changing trends and effects 
in 1990, both international and national societies have seriously considered and made 
efforts on greenhouse gases mitigation. A milestone of the efforts on international co-
operation for combating global warming was the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997. The Protocol sets 
out that each party included in Annex I to the FCCC
1 shall achieve its quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B under Article 3. According to 
the Kyoto Protocol, carbon-equivalent greenhouse gases in Annex I region shall be reduced 
5% in 2010 from their 1990 level. 
Main greenhouse gases have the uniform-mixing feature that mitigation taking place 
anywhere will have same effects in environmental aspect. On the other hand, mitigation in 
different places may have different effects in economic aspect. Current economic and 
environmental research has revealed that different nations would have different cost 
curves for greenhouse gases mitigation. Particularly, while some large developing countries 
and the countries in economic transition see very cheap opportunities, developed countries 
in general would face high cost curves and it might be too costly for them to achieve their 
emission reduction goals. There however is an efficient way to achieve the goals, in which 
mitigation shall take place wherever it is the cheapest. Based on the facts, the Kyoto 
Protocol, while maintaining domestic  mitigation efforts, promotes international emissions 
trading to help high-cost countries to achieve their goals committed in the Protocol. The 
international emissions trading has three flexible forms as defined in the Kyoto Protocol 
that Joint Implementation (JI) in Article 6, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in Article 
12, and Emissions Trading (ET) in Article 17, respectively.   
An emissions trading system enables the country with reduction commitment to determine 
whether it shall take actions domestically or abroad, depending on the difference in 
marginal abatement costs between domestic and abroad. At equilibrium, marginal 
abatement costs will be equivalent everywhere. In the situation, countries are indifferent 
with abating domestically or abroad. The Kyoto Protocol defines emissions trading as that 
allowing Annex I countries to trade emission reduction units that are above or below their 
emission quotas agreed in the protocol in supplement to domestic actions. The application 
of ET requires a full international agreement and a well-established trading market. At the 
current stage of international negotiations, there is distance from the application of ET. 
Alternatively, the Protocol also suggests JI and CDM, which could achieve similar results, 
as the variants of ET. 
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The Kyoto Protocol approaches Joint Implementation as that allowing transfers of 
emission reduction units resulting from emission reduction or removal projects among the 
Annex I countries. JI constitutes investing countries, host countries, and a third party. The 
investing countries are the Annex I countries that have high cost functions of domestic 
commitments, while the host countries are the Annex I countries with low cost function 
for meeting their commitments. The investing countries invest emission reduction or 
removal projects in host countries in exchange for emission reduction credits, which will 
offset the obligations for domestic action. Third party is an international environmental 
agency, which shall be formed by the parties involved in the Kyoto Protocol. Its role may 
include providing guidelines for potential projects of both sides of the engaging countries, 
monitoring, evaluation, verification, and certification. A JI project may be funded by an 
investing country, or jointly by  several investing countries, or by an international 
organisation whose funds come from investing countries. Both investing and host 
countries may be allowed to invest on or host several projects.   
In the Protocol, a Clean Development Mechanism allows transfers of emission reduction 
units resulting from emission reduction or removal projects between Annex I and non-
Annex I countries. Its principles are similar with the JI. However, the Kyoto protocol 
defines the CDM with two-fold objectives: namely emission reduction and sustainable 
development for host non-Annex I countries. In general, the CDM is regarded to have 
greater potential in reducing emission reduction costs than the JI. Because there exist very 
low cost opportunities of abatement in non-Annex I c ountries. A striking difference 
between JI and CDM is that while host countries in JI commit to emission reduction 
targets, host countries, non-Annex I countries, in CDM not.  
In general, JI and CDM are regarded to be both economically and environmentally  less 
efficient than ET for that they only involve partial co-operation. Firstly, JI and CDM only 
occur in the absence of ET or, in other words, that a full range of international agreement 
is not available. In this sense, some low-cost or main emitters may stand aside global 
combating action. Secondly, JI and CDM mean project-level emissions trading. The project 
possibilities vary from sector to sector and are very small in certain sectors. Therefore, the 
potential of efficiency improvement for JI and CDM is more limited than for ET. Thirdly, JI 
and CDM projects are set up and implemented between a few of nations. This situation 
may create a number of negative factors such as carbon leakage, free riding, and high 
transaction costs, inducing inefficiency. 
The spirit of the flexible mechanisms is to improve cost efficiency through international co-
operation and therefore to enhance environmental efficiency. Research has revealed that 
the maximal gain in cost efficiency is from no trading to global trading. As a global trading 
is unrealistic so far due to the unequal distribution of better off or worse-off across 
nations, current researches focus on searching alternative solutions. JI and CDM are two 
of those possible measures that are able to improve cost efficiency to the extent less than 
the full emissions trading within Annex I region and within global region, respectively.  
The present paper is to review recent studies on the Kyoto flexible mechanisms with 
particular focus on JI and CDM. In section 2 and 3, w e present background and 
conceptual materials for the application of JI and CDM. Section 4 explores theoretical 
issues with JI and CDM, where we discuss cost efficiency, benefit distribution, baselines, 
and a number of other problems in relation to JI and  CDM. Section 5 reviews present Survey 
empirical researches. Instead of discussing the details of each research
2, we focus on the 
scenarios that these researches have done, and the gaps that the researches have 
remained. Finally, in section 6 we draw our proposal  of investigating macroeconomic 
implications of JI and CDM to Europe and Belgium through GEM-E3 modelling. 
2.  OVERVIEW ON MITIGATION ACTIONS AND COSTS 
2.1.  Global warming and its impact  
The human society has become increasingly aware of the potential threat of global 
warming since last decade, on basis of the revelation of scientific evidences and the 
perception of the continuing rise in temperature during recent years. IPCC I (1990, 1995) 
reports that while a natural greenhouse effect has been keeping the Earth warmer than it 
would otherwise be, a man-made greenhouse effect caused by the fast atmospheric 
concentrations of the greenhouse gases emissions will result in an additional warming of 
the Earth’s surface. During the last century, Earth’s surface air temperature has increased 
by 0.3°C to 0.6°C, with the five global-average warmest years being in the 1980s. If 
human society does not take any measures to combat the global warming, the predicted 
increase rate of surface air temperature would be at 0.3°C per decade during this century. 
Recent observation reports the year 1998 was the warmest ever in human history
3. 
The impacts of global warming on earth and human society are rather complex and to a 
large extent unpredictable so far. Scientific research has not been able to determine 
whether a small increase in temperature will be better or worse. However, if global 
temperature increases significantly and the associated climate changes fast, the negative 
effects of global warming will certainly dominate the positive  effects. Therefore, human 
society may run the risk of catastrophe in future if it does not consider for controlling the 
global warming from now. 
2.2.  Action strategies 
In response to this adverse situation, human society in general has three ways to protect 
itself -adaptation, climate engineering and abatement. Adaptation measures accept climate 
changes and attempt to minimise the damage of negative effects through adapting human 
society to the climate changes. Examples include migration, development of drought-
resistant plant strains, construction of sea defences, etc. Climate engineering is to offset 
directly the warming in the lower atmosphere through altering the reflectivity of the 
earth’s atmosphere, enhancing the cooling effects of water circulation and screening the 
earth’s atmosphere from the sun’s rays. Adaptation and climate engineering are able to 
offset both natural and man-made greenhouse effects. At current stage, however, as 
these strategies are limited by technological progress and involve large u ncertainty, they 
can yet be adopted as mainstreams of the actions combating global warming. 
                                                 
2 We will not evaluate the models since they are common in principle and different mostly in assumptions. We 
will also not discuss the results yielded from the models because we find that the researches provide rather 
consistent results on basis of same assumptions. 
3 BBC broadcast program on climate change in May 2000. Survey 
Abatement, targeting at man-made emissions, is adopted to moderate the growth of 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It includes sink enhancement and 
emissions abatement. Sink enhancement expands the Earth’s ability in absorbing gases 
emissions by, for example, reforestation, but it is limited by land available and its 
absorbing rate in general is slower than the increase of the atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases. Whereas emissions abatement curbs emissions at source by conducting 
human activity towards producing few emissions in short run and by using clean 
technologies in long run.  
2.3.  International co-operations and the Kyoto protocol 
Main forms of greenhouse gases, typically CO2, are mixed uniformly at the atmosphere. 
Because of this feature, the abatement of these greenhouse gases has two economic 
implications. On the one hand, an individual abatement of the uniform mixing greenhouse 
gases will generate positive externality to others who can take full free riding or even 
make some offset. On the other hand, the abatement of these greenhouse gases is free to 
take place anywhere over the world for the purposes of both environmental efficiency and 
cost efficiency. Therefore, by nature combating climate change calls for global actions on 
the abatement of uniformly mixing greenhouse gases. 
Historically, several international agreements on specific environmental problems have 
been established. The Montreal Protocol on the control of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Second Sulphur Protocol on the Long 
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, and the Rhine 'Salts' treaty were the examples. 
International agreement on climate change started from the adoption of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1992. It was entered into force in 
1994. The goal of the Convention is to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system. During the Third Conference of the Parties to the FCCC at Kyoto in 
1997, the conference passed a Kyoto protocol, which is the first international agreement 
on climate change. In the Kyoto protocol, developed countries made voluntary 
commitments to stabilise carbon emissions at 5% less than 1990 levels by 2012. The 
protocol lists the six types of greenhouse gases in Annex A: namely carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The protocol also prescribes the committed countries and 
corresponding commitments (in its Annex B). These countries are identical to Annex I 
countries to FCCC, which include the OECD countries, the countries in Eastern Europe and 
the states of the former Soviet Union. The carbon-equivalent emissions reduction targets 
are specified that, for instance, US should reduce emission 7%, Japan 6%, and EU-wide 
8% from their 1990 levels by 2012. The compliance period defined in the protocol is five 
years. In addition, the protocol recommends a set of flexible mechanisms to help the 
countries to reduce the costs achieving the targets. These mechanisms include emissions 
trading (ET), joint implementation (JI), and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
Indeed, the Kyoto protocol has outlined the forefront of industrial countries' action 
towards combating global warming since the launching. However, it has also received 
numerous arguments. At present time, it seems that the protocol will be less likely ratified Survey 
because of the objections from some major nations. Two main types of the arguments 
against the protocol are the following. Firstly, the protocol will limit Annex B  countries' 
emissions but do nothing to developing world among which some major developing 
countries are expected to increase emissions rapidly with their economic growth. For this 
reason, the Kyoto protocol will not ensure global environmental efficiency. Secondly, the 
protocol emphasis on the importance of domestic abatement and restricts the scale of 
international co-operation, therefore does not move towards full cost efficiency. In 
particular, under the restrictions some countries like US (Nordhaus, 1999) who commit to 
emissions reduction and will suffer high level of domestic abatement costs will not be able 
to relax their loads. 
An enhanced argument against the Kyoto protocol is that even if the protocol were enter 
into force, it would not be able to  fulfil FCCC's goal of stabilising greenhouse gases 
concentrations (Edmonds, 1999). Thus, recently there is an increasing trend to consider 
actions beyond the Kyoto Protocol. Edmonds (1999) summarised three critical issues 
needing to be dealt with  -- the long-term nature of the climate change problem, the 
mechanisms to control costs, and the accession to non-Annex I nations in the formal 
mitigation process. 
2.4.  CO2 abatement 
Among the greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is mostly responsible for the greenhouse 
effects. IPCC I (1990) has detected that CO2 has the share of 65% in all greenhouse 
gases. Therefore, current practice primarily considers to abate CO2 emission. More 
specifically, economic instruments focus on curbing CO2 emission that mainly results from 
combustion of fossil fuels. In Ekins (1995, p241), economic instruments on CO2 
abatement could induce the following consequences:  
(a)  Reduction in demand for carbon-based fuels 
(b)  Substitutions between more and less carbon-intensive fuels 
(c)  Changes from carbon-based to non-carbon fuels 
(d)  Changes from energy to other factors of production 
(e)  Changes between more and less carbon-intensive products and processes 
(f)  Improvement in the efficiency of fuel use in delivering a particular energy service 
(g)  And, development of new, less carbon-intensive technologies, products and 
processes. 
2.5.  Abatement costs 
The actions combating global warming certainly incur costs in every step. However, we 
focus on the discussion on CO2 abatement costs incurred by market-based instruments. 
The abatement costs usually are defined in terms of incremental costs, which refer to the 
costs of a particular abatement action over the costs in a reference where the abatement 
is absent. These costs can be distinguished at four levels: the technique level, the project 
level, the sector level, and the economy level. At the technique level, costs are the direct Survey 
engineering and financial costs of specific techniques. At the project level, costs equal to 
total cost that the project implies, which covers all the costs incurred during the project 
from the investment, to operation and maintenance, and to monitoring and verification. At 
the sector level, the incremental costs are identified as the variation from the reference. 
The costs include both the incremental costs of specific projects and the induced costs to 
relevant sector, but exclude the feedback effects between the behaviour of the sector and 
that of the overall economy. At the economy or national level, the incremental costs 
summarise all costs incurred from any abatement actions, including technical costs, 
project costs, sector variation and national economic changes. 
Economic instruments in general bring about costs at economy, sector or project level 
rather than at technique level. For CO2 abatement, if the market-based instrument is 
carbon tax, abatement costs are measured at economy level. Figure 1 illustrates the case. 
In upper figure, the original equilibrium is at point  E*, where carbon quantity is Q* and 
equilibrium cost or price is P*. A carbon tax,  T, will  add an extra cost into supply price 
and thus shift supply curve up. The new equilibrium is at point E° now, where carbon tax, 
T, equals to  E°C or P°P*, carbon quantity decreases by Q*-Q° and equilibrium price 
increases by P°-P*. The resulting loss is the area of P°E°E*EP, which consists of the loss 
in consumer’s surplus, P°E°E*P*, and in producer’s surplus, P*E*EP.  
As carbon tax rises from zero at E* towards E°C or even further to left, carbon reduction 
shown in lower figure increases, the associated loss in consumer surplus constitutes a 
marginal cost curve for the case. Researches have found that marginal abatement cost is 
an increasing function of abatement efforts. In particular, if abatement is a small amount, 
abatement cost could be very low or even negative, however, if abatement targets are 
ambitious, the abatement costs could become too high to fulfil the targets.
4 From the 
figure, we can see that significant abatement will require high emission tax rate and thus 
incur large abatement costs. 
                                                 
4 The well-known reports on the estimation of high abatement costs, cited in Ekins (1995), are Manne-Richels 
(1990), Nordhaus (1991), Pezzey (1991), Beckerman (1991), and Hampson (1993). Weyant (1999) provides 
the most recent  
results on abatement costs. Survey 


















2.6.  The measures of abatement costs 
Figure 1 illustrates abatement cost in terms of consumer surplus, which is also called 
equivalent variation (EV). Besides this, there exist other alternative measures of abatement 
costs, including carbon taxes, direct cost, total resource costs, GDP, GNP, aggregate 
economic consumption, and discounted aggregate consumption. Figure 1 is also able to 
show some of these cost measures. Carbon tax, E°C, is related to abatement cost, but it 
is an imperfect measure of welfare costs. Total resource costs, including the losses in 
consumer and producer surplus, is the area of P°E°E*EP in the upper part of Figure 1. 
Direct cost equals the dead-weight loss in the area of E°E*C. Its corresponding cost curve 
can also be seen from the lower part of the figure. GDP is an aggregate measure at 
economy level. It is able to capture the impacts on the overall economy of economic 
policies in specific sectors. 
2.7.  The distribution of abatement costs 
Abatement costs are subject to many factors such as population growth, consumption 
patterns, resource and technology availability, and geographical allocation of activity, land Survey 
use and transportation patterns, and trade. As the result, abatement costs are different 
among sectors, among regions, and among nations. The cost efficiency of Kyoto flexible 
mechanisms relies on the significant difference in abatement costs between countries and 
between sectors (Barrett 1992). Many studies
5 have reported on the distribution of CO2 
abatement costs over the world. There are sharp differences in abatement costs between 
developed, transitional, and developing countries. A few studies also expose the 
abatement costs among sectors and firms within nations. 
2.8.  Abatement benefits 
2.8.1.  Revenue recycling 
Economic penalisation on emissions will incur costs to agents on the one hand, and will 
generate revenues to the regulators on the other hand. When the intended emissions 
reduction is significant, the associated revenue could be a large amount. It is therefore 
argued that overall economic efficiency could be improved if the revenues generated from 
emission regulation are used to phase out some existing market distortions (Bovenberg and 
Guilder, 1995). 
2.8.2.  Net benefits (positive costs, or no regret) 
Abatement may not necessarily result in net costs, rather it may bring about net benefits, 
if abatement scale is small (Jackson, 1995). These benefits may be due to the adoption of 
more efficient environmental technologies, the decrease of the distortion in  economic 
system, the growth of stimulated innovations, and the positive externality of the 
abatement of other pollutants. The potential of the net benefit results associated with low-
cost abatement options exists in both Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Considering the 
positive impacts of the improvement of tax distortion, the revenue recycling, and the 
secondary benefits of reducing greenhouse gases emission, a large room for the net 
benefit is possible. Ekins (1995) checked the net benefits mentioned in a number of 
reports and surveys regarding CO2 abatement costs. He concludes that it is not very 
definite that a moderate abatement of CO2 emission will incur net costs when it can 
improve unemployment and prior tax distortions, recycle revenue, and bring the secondary 
benefits of reducing CO2 emissions. 
2.9.  The bottom-up and top-down methods 
During last decade, most researches focus on greenhouse gases abatement focused on the 
estimation of abatement costs. Despite of the short history, the methods estimating the 
costs have fallen into two families: bottom-up and top-down models.
6 A bottom-up 
method is to compare the costs of a specific environmental technology in different 
countries. While the method is effective for project-based abatement actions, e.g. JI or 
                                                 
5 E.g. Chandler and Evans, 1996, for post-planned economies; Krause, 1996, for Europe; Shukla, 1995, and 
Sathaye and Christensen, 1994, for developing countries. 
6 The detailed review on these two families was in IPCC (1995); a recent review is available from Capros et al 
(1999). Survey 
CDM, it is limited in capturing macroeconomic implications of potential projects. On 
contrast, a top-down method constructs environmental system into economic system to 
capture the impact of environmental instruments on environmental system, the feedback 
of the environmental system on economic system, and the implication of economic system 
for the instruments. The top-down analysis is strong in sheding light on policy 
perspectives. In particular, the method is able to identify whether a country will benefit 
from the adoption of a specific mechanism and to show how the country can achieve the 
maximal benefit, etc. 
3.  ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 
3.1.  Environmental policy  
By its nature, emissions abatement is particularly relevant with the application of 
environmental policy instruments. There exist a variety of these instruments, two main 
groups of which are regulatory instruments and market-based or economic instruments. In 
addition, there are other instruments including voluntary agreement, informational and 
organizational instruments.  
The regulatory instruments including technology and performance-based standards or 
product standards or bans have been widely applied for decades. This group of 
instruments however can not ensure cost efficiency as it does not give emitters the 
incentives to use cheap options available in short run and to encourage environmental 
technology innovations in long run. Moreover, this group of instruments may not be well 
compatible with international agreement. Because nations in general face different 
domestic marginal abatement costs, a specific regulation that internationally fixes national 
emission level would result in unnecessarily high abatement costs and therefore are 
unacceptable for a wide range of countries (IPCC III, pp. 404). 
Whereas e conomic instruments, by adding an extra cost to emitters to make emission 
more expensive for production or consumption, will induce the shift from emission 
activities towards less or none emission activities. This group of instruments therefore is 
attractive in cost efficiency and hence in environment efficiency. Recent trend shows that 
the market-based or economic instruments are phasing out the regulatory instruments 
particularly in industrial nations (Capros, 1999, pp. 27-31).  
The economic instruments h ave two basic forms: namely emission taxes and emissions 
trading. Under perfectly competitive markets, an emission tax will induce emitters to 
reduce emission at a level where the marginal abatement cost is equal to the emission tax 
rate. Similarly, a scheme of emissions trading will induce emitters to reduce or increase 
emission at a level where the marginal abatement cost is equal to the equilibrium price of 
the emission quota. Therefore, an emission tax can be identical to a scheme of emissions 
trading if initial emission permits or quotas are distributed by auction and the markets fulfil 
both competitive and certainty conditions.  Survey 
3.2.  Emission tax 
In domestic markets, greenhouse gases emission tax can be in the form of domestic 
carbon tax or energy tax. The former levies on the carbon content of primary fossil fuels, 
while the latter on energy content of fuels or the value of energy products. The carbon tax 
is a more efficient instrument for reducing energy sector CO2 emissions than energy tax 
since an energy tax will not only penalise the CO2 emission energy but also hurt the non-
CO2 emission energy. Carbon tax however is not a perfect proxy for a CO2 tax. The 
disadvantages caused by domestic carbon and energy tax may be that these taxes will 
hurt the competitiveness of domestic energy firms and create carbon leakage outside 
domestic. 
In international markets, emission tax has two general forms: namely international tax and 
harmonised domestic taxes. Under an internationally agreed emission target, an 
international tax is imposed on the nations in agreement by an international agency. The 
tax works similarly as domestic tax does, but it has difference from domestic tax. With 
international tax, the nations in agreement, rather than domestic firms, pay the tax to an 
international agency, rather than national governments, and it is the agency receiving and 
redistributing the tax revenues. Whether a nation uses domestic environmental policies or 
tax forms is irrelevant with the international tax obligation. However, the tax form will 
encounter problem when the tax revenues are huge, because it is difficult for an 
international agency to handle this amount of tax (Grubb, 1992). The harmonised 
domestic taxes require the nations in agreement levy the same domestic emission tax and 
compensate the losing countries from the gaining countries. Hoel (1992) concludes the 
harmonised domestic taxes may be the only realistic form for international taxes. 
3.3.  Emissions trading 
Emissions trading within domestic markets, called domestic emissions trading or permits 
trading, consists of a given amount of emissions, an initial allocation of emission permits 
according to certain rules, and a trading mechanism (Capros, 1999, pp. 38-39). The 
emission quantity can be determined under domestic  environmental regulations or with 
international agreements. The allocating rules could be many, but most popular ones are 
the grandfather and the auction. Under a grandfather allocation, government gives firms 
the emission permits based on historical records. Under an auction allocation, government 
sells the emission permits to firms by auction. In either case, a firm with emissions below 
its permits could sell the surplus for revenue. Otherwise, if a firm requires the emissions 
above its permits, it has to buy the extra permits. The drive behind the trading is that each 
firm decides controlling emissions or buying permits by comparing control costs with 
market prices of emission permits until the firm is indifferent between abating by itself and 
buying permits. As the result, the trading price of emission permits is determined at the 
permit trading market equilibrium. It is argued that the tradable permits is the most 
promising one among the potential economic instruments, because it allows maximal 
flexibility for firms’ choices, ensures cost efficiency and thus environment efficiency, and 
stimulates environmental technological innovations (Grubb, 1992). Past experience has 
shown that tradable permits were a powerful and efficient mechanism in domestic 
emissions reduction (Tietenberg, 1999). Survey 
Emissions trading can take place among nations. The case is called international emissions 
trading or tradable quotas, which consist of an emission target and an allocation of the 
quotas agreed by a number of nations, and a trading mechanism. As international emission 
tax works like domestic emission tax, international emissions trading also has similar 
working mechanism with domestic emissions trading. The differences are that the 
dimensional level shall change from trading among domestic firms to among the nations in 
international agreement, and there need international emissions trading markets. However, 
the international emissions trading cannot simply follow the success of domestic emissions 
trading, because it may undermine developed countries’ incentive for domestic abatement 
and may even deteriorate overall greenhouse gas effect. The Kyoto protocol has 
recommended Annex I countries to use international emissions trading, but it has not yet 
clearly defined the mechanism. 
3.4.  Joint implementation and Clean Development Mechanism 
3.4.1.  The concepts 
A variant form of emissions trading is the so-called offsetting or relaxing mechanism 
(Grubb, 1992). The idea is that an emission party can offset or relax its emission targets 
by investing in emissions reduction in other parties in exchange for emission credits, rather 
than by purchasing emission permits. A specific application of the idea is the joint 
implementation, which at outset defines that a nation under international emission 
agreement can offset or relax its emission target by investing in other countries. The 
revolution of the application further distinguishes host countries between two groups: the 
countries in international agreement and the countries outside international agreement. By 
the distinction, the first group now refers to joint implementation, whereas the second 
group refers to a Clean Development Mechanism.  
The Kyoto protocol is the first document formally addressing the distinction. The Article 6 
of the Kyoto protocol explicitly defines joint implementation (JI) as that allowing transfers 
of emission reduction units resulting from emission reduction or removal projects among 
the Annex I countries. The objective of JI is to reduce total costs of fulfilling Annex I 
countries’ commitments under Kyoto protocol as to ensure the targets of emission 
reduction. Primarily, joint implementation constitutes investing countries, host countries, 
and a third party. The investing countries are the Annex I countries that will face high 
abatement costs for meeting their commitments, while the host countries are the Annex I 
countries with low cost function for meeting their commitments. The investing countries 
invest emission reduction or removal projects in host countries in exchange for emission 
reduction credits to offset or relax their obligations. Third party is an international 
environmental agency, which shall be formed by the parties involved in the Kyoto 
protocol. Its role may include providing guidelines for potential projects of both sides of 
the engaging countries, monitoring, evaluation, verification, and certification. A JI project 
may be funded by an investing country, or jointly by several investing countries, or by an 
international organisation whose funds come from investing countries. Both investing and 
host countries may be allowed to invest on or host several projects. Survey 
In Article 12, the Kyoto Protocol specifies that a Clean Development Mechanism ( CDM) 
allows the transfers of emission reduction units resulting from emission reduction or 
removal projects between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The principle and 
institutions of a CDM are similar with the one of a JI. However, the Kyoto protocol 
specifies that the CDM is not merely intended to reduce the costs of achieving an 
environmental task but also to help non-Annex I countries with sustainable development. 
3.4.2.  The relationships between ET, JI and CDM 
Since the Kyoto protocol launches the flexible mechanisms, numerous studies on them 
have emerged. At current stage, because most of the mechanisms have not been 
practised
7 and empirical simulations on the mechanisms frequently show a wild range of 
results, theoretical debates on the economic relationship between the mechanisms remain 
rather controversial. 
By nature, ET would be environmentally more efficient than JI/CDM. JI/CDM in general is 
regarded as a step before ET (Rentz, 1995). It works when ET is yet available and will 
become unnecessary when ET can be implemented (Tietenberg, 1999). Compared with 
ET, JI/CDM is limited to reduce economy-wide emissions, because only certain sectors 
such as agriculture, energy and energy-intensive sectors may provide the possibility for the 
emission reduction projects involved with JI/CDM. For example, foreign investors may 
invest for i mproving efficiency in an electrical power plant, but may not be able to 
intervene in host countries' tax system by financial compensation. Whereas with ET host 
countries can execute whatever measures to curb domestic emissions. 
However, the establishment of ET requires deliberate design, otherwise it may run the risk 
of environmental loss. Woerdman (2000) argues that in the case of "hot air", ET may in 
fact result in more emissions than the Kyoto target, whereas JI/CDM will always yield new 
emission reduction units in addition to Annex I countries’ commitment. 
Most researches consider that ET will be economically more efficient than JI/CDM. The 
application of JI/CDM implies that only a part of the potential parties, which otherwise 
would all present in ET,  involve with an international co-operation. As the result, the 
allocation of cheap abatement opportunities with JI/CDM will not be as optimal as with 
ET. Furthermore, JI/CDM involves more transaction costs than ET, because of its project-
based nature that transaction costs will associate with each project (Tietenberg, 1992). 
Some authors however have suggested a reversal situation that JI/CDM is cheaper than 
ET. Woerdman (2000) compares the credit prices involved in a number of AIJ projects
8 
with the permit prices in ET empirically estimated by various models, and finds that the 
permit prices are much higher than the credit prices. Bollen  (1999) analyses that the ET 
within Annex I will generate a uniform permit price that equals to the marginal abatement 
cost in the region, whereas in the case of JI there will be one separate price for each 
project, which might be negotiated and will equal to the marginal abatement cost in 
individual project. In general, the JI prices are lower than the marginal abatement cost of 
the whole Annex I region. Woerdman (2000) further argues that the neo-classical style 
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trading of ET may not be valid and that there are the methodologies available to lower 
transaction costs in JI/CDM. He suggests that the learning process and the region-by-
project baseline matrices will be effective in cutting down transaction costs in JI/CDM 
projects. 
CDM in general has greater potential for cost efficiency than JI. Many researches have 
reported that non-Annex I countries have very low abatement costs compared with Annex 
I region (Zhang, 2000; Shukla, 1995; Sathaye and Christensen, 1994; Krause, 1996; 
Chandler, et al, 1996). However, CDM may not easily achieve its cost efficiency. There 
are a number of adverse factors likely to erode the potential of cost efficiency. Because 
host countries in CDM are not subject to emissions reduction targets, they tend to take 
free riding by delaying or forgoing their own abatement efforts that otherwise will be made 
(Roland and Haugland, 1994). Also, in order to prevent  both the sides of a CDM project 
from exaggerating the abatement effect (Roland and Haugland, 1994; Hagem, 1995; Wirl, 
et al. 1998), CDM has to require the strength in information collection, negotiation, 
monitoring, and enforcement and thus incur more transaction costs. In addition, the high 
price elasticity of energy in developing countries will also absorb part of abatement effort 
involved with CDM projects (Roland and Haugland, 1994). 
Woerdman (2000) argues that JI/CDM is more practicable than ET, a s it only requires 
partial participation of parties. Although ET is theoretically superior to JI/CDM, it has 
disadvantage in application, because it has to involve the full agreement of all parties and 
specify the initial allocating rules of emission permits. 
4.  ISSUES WITH JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND CLEAN 
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
4.1.  Cost efficiency 
The spirit of JI/CDM lies on that they could increase cost efficiency in case that a full 
range of international emissions trading is unavailable. Figure 2 illustrates how the costs 
could be reduced in JI/CDM. Assume that country A commits an emission reduction target 
a1 and country B is not subject to such commitment. And, assume that the two countries 
are facing different abatement cost curves, country  A is lower than country  B when 
abatement target is less than a0, and greater than country B thereafter to the abatement 
target a1. From the figure, it is clear that if the two countries co-operate together to abate 
along the least-cost paths, they can realise the cost efficiency. This co-operation can be in 
the form of either ET, JI, or CDM in which country A abates a0 domestically and shifts the 
rest of its target, a1-a0, to country B. 









4.2.  Benefits distribution 
4.2.1.  Distribution rules 
As the figure 2 shows, the area  C1C2C3 indicates the potential for cost saving resulted 
from the co-operation between country A and B. A question naturally arisen is how this 
cost saving would be shared by the two countries. Since in the international context no 
super-countries could impose others, international emissions trading must be based on the 
voluntary agreement in which the nations shall share benefits equally. In Rose (1992), the 
cost efficiency and the benefit equity are likewise important to emissions trading. Because 
with emissions trading the efficiency and equity is the separate issues, according to the 
Coase theorem that no matter how initial allocation of emission permits is, through market 
exchange the emission permits will lead to efficiency. Thus, one of the most important 
aspects with emissions trading is to design sharing rules to ensure equity. Research has 
explored many these rules. Rose and Kverndokk (1998) summarise the typical rules as 
follows: 
(a)  According to allocation-based criterion: Sovereignty, Egalitarian and Ability to Pay 
rules 
(b)  According to outcome-based criterion: Horizontal, Vertical and Compensation rules 
(c)  According to process-based criterion: Raw's Maximin, Consensus and Market 
Justice rules 
In the formation of emissions trading agreement, these rules could be applied individually 
or jointly in order for equity. 
4.2.2.  Investing counties' position in sharing the benefits 
The main purpose that the Kyoto protocol introduces the flexible mechanisms is to assist 
industrial countries to avoid high costs in fulfilling their emission limitation and reduction Survey 
commitments. Apparently, investing countries, which in general are industrial countries, 
will be the most direct beneficiaries because the countries need less investment in host 
countries than domestically to achieve their commitments if the flexible mechanisms are 
applied successfully. Thus, investing countries can achieve direct cost saving.  
Furthermore, under JI/CDM, investing countries may even be able to assess indirect 
positive impacts on domestic markets by enforcing exports, which in turn may stimulate 
domestic innovation and production, of their environmental technologies and goods to host 
countries. From the point of view of investing countries, whether a JI or CDM project is 
merely costly or can bring benefit depends on its channels to funding. When JI/CDM 
promises a purely financial transfer, it may consume the public or private funds of 
investing countries. Under the consequent compressed budgets of government or private 
company, unemployment, public deficits, tax distortions, and foreign balances can not be 
improved. When JI/CDM promotes the exports of domestic environmental technologies 
and goods in investing countries to receiving countries, it has potential to improve 
domestic distortions, stimulate environmental technology innovations, and expand 
productions. Under the consideration of this type of benefit, the estimated cost efficiency 
by JI/CDM would be expected to increase. So far, the benefit however is ignored in 
empirical research. 
Under CDM, investing countries may also gain from the negotiations and bargaining with 
developing countries. Because the investing countries have strong economic position and 
have invested much in the information required for framing CDM projects, whereas 
developing countries are unable to access the full information (IPCC III, 112). 
However, investing countries' position in getting majority of benefits may be undermined if 
market power exists in host side. 
4.2.3.  Host countries' position in sharing the benefits 
In contrast to the striking benefits to be obtained by investing countries, the benefits of 
host countries are ambiguous. With ET within Annex I region, delicately designed and 
widely agreed sharing rules could solve the problem of burden sharing. JI, as a special 
form of ET, can be to large extent subject to the sharing rules applied as well if it is 
implemented at the scale close to the emissions trading. However, if JI is limited within 
small range, negotiation, bargaining, information available, and other elements could affect 
benefit distribution. 
In case of CDM, the distributions of costs or benefits however are uncertain or ambiguous. 
There is concern that CDM may cause unequal distribution of benefits for two reasons. 
Firstly, because host countries are the countries not committed to emission reduction 
targets, they are not ensured by the sharing rules. The benefit distribution of CDM may 
depend on negotiations and bargaining in which developing countries have disadvantages 
in general. Secondly, potential indirect costs induced by CDM project and development 
assistance to be required have not been explored clearly in developing countries. In 
general, investing countries will cover the full costs of a CDM project and host country has 
no worry about them. However, an introduction of a CDM project may have both positive 
and negative impacts on the markets in host country. The main implication of the former is 
that foreign investment will push domestic demands and therefore stimulate production. Survey 
The latter includes the concern that the insertion of an external CDM project into domestic 
markets may increase the incompatibility with the domestic economic system in host 
country. For example, intensive reforestation projects i n China will use up numerous 
amount of its scarce land, in turn China has to increase its agricultural import. The 
estimation of indirect costs and extra benefits of CDM has to be based on specific cases 
and be done in economy-wide systematic framework. Unfortunately, most developing 
countries do not have well-established environmental and economic systems, there are 
few reports identifying the possible indirect impacts on host countries. On the other hand, 
host countries in general strongly demand for the assistance for sustainable development 
from developed countries. Therefore, how large the extra investment besides the project 
costs should be added in order to attract potential host country to accept a CDM project 
remains unsolved. 
In the point of view of economist, under competitive markets of CDM the equilibrium price 
will determine the full costs of CDM projects. The problem with this proposition is that the 
competitive markets are more likely to be imperfect, since big countries exist in both sides 
of the supply and demand.
9 The market power may therefore bias the benefit distributions 
between and within the supply and demand parties. In particular, in case that there are 
large supplies available from transitional and developing countries, the equilibrium prices 
will be so low that host countries can not benefit significantly from the projects (Zhang, 
1999). 
From the long-run perspective, host country seriously concerns that it may eventually 
suffer a loss when it will have to commit itself to certain emission control targets in 
future. Because CDM projects could lead to exhaustion of cheap opportunities for emission 
mitigation in host country and leave only high cost options to host country. Rose et al. 
(1999) have explored the long run implications of CDM to developing countries, and finds 
that cumulative abatement effects could impose costs on the future, but the costs can be 
offset by technological change, market power, or compensation. 
The possibility of unequal distribution of benefits under CDM may hinder the feasibility of 
CDM's application, unless the mechanism is designed on basis of equity. Van der Burg 
(1994) and a number of other propositions point out that the commitments of investing 
countries should be made more stringent, or even levying a  tax on CDM projects to 
redistribute the investor's surplus. 
4.3.  Developed countries’ motivation 
The Kyoto protocol underscores the importance of domestic abatement in Annex I 
countries in defining that the flexible mechanisms are only supplemental to the domestic 
actions. This is based on a fundamental concern that allowing industrial countries to trade 
JI and CDM investments for emission credits will reduce their incentives for domestic 
action, and may undermine their commitments to achieve global climate stabilisation. For 
the fact that a large pool of the cheap abatement opportunities exist in the countries in 
economic transition and in developing countries, shifting most of their commitments 
through JI or CDM may be economically efficient for industrial countries. Therefore, there 
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is the possibility that developed countries may unload their obligations for domestic action 
onto the host countries through investing in JI or CDM projects, if they are not bounded to 
domestic abatement. 
Industrial countries, which are mostly responsible for the increase of global greenhouse 
gases emission, should make most efforts in reducing domestic greenhouse gases 
emissions. Studies have revealed that industrial countries have large potentials for 
greenhouse gases reduction. I n some developed countries, there are even significant 
benefits for the reduction options. 
Jackson (1995) examines the cost potentials for JI
10 with an example of four countries, 
Denmark, the UK, Poland, and Zimbabwe. The research designs seven hypothetical JI 
cases and uses joint cost curves along the least-cost paths to analyze the implications of 
cost efficiency. Jackson finds out that developed countries have more potentials for no 
regret options than transitional and developing countries. Due to the fact, JI may not be a 
cheap way for developed countries to seek under certain reduction targets. JI may be 
helpful for developed countries only when they are obligated for some high reduction 
targets. 
There are a number of measures being discussed to enforce  developed countries to take 
domestic actions. The three main measures are the following. First, allowing developed 
country for using JI and CDM only in the case that it has used out its cheaper options and 
will be facing very costly options otherwise in domestic. Second, setting a ceiling on 
allocating JI and CDM projects to developed countries. A number of researches have been 
aware that due to the supplementary concept defined in the Kyoto protocol no countries 
may be allowed to shift their full obligations through JI or CDM. The researches therefore 
attempt to restrict developed countries’ demands for JI or CDM by quotas. So far, how to 
define the restriction and distribute the quotas however remains open. Third, taking a 
discounting measure for distributing credits to JI and CDM projects. At the current stage 
how to define a ceiling and how to credit emission reduction units in relation with 
particular projects is under study. 
4.4.  Free riding 
Free riding erodes environmental efficiency. It will happen when some parties are outside 
environmental commitment. In case of CDM, developing countries have incentive to take 
free riding. Since host countries can foresee the oncoming foreign investment in emissions 
abatement, they have no incentive to curb the emission b y themselves. Roland and 
Haugland (1994) estimate that the free riding share could be 50% with Poland and Mexico 
JI projects, and 70% and 30-50% in relation to energy conservation programmes in 
Norway and United States, respectively. It is worthy to notice that free riding results not 
only from the abstention from environmental investment in host countries but also from 
the abstention and delay of their environmental regulations. 
In order to prevent the potential free riding, a CDM project must be additional. If a CDM 
project is not additional, it cannot lead to a net reduction of CO2 emission from global 
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environmental point of view. Van der Burg (1994) and many others proposed the concept 
of additionality to ensure efficiency of CDM projects
11. The additionality states that a CDM 
project can be regarded as additional when it would not exist without the CDM. The Kyoto 
protocol definitely requires that any JI or CDM projects must be additional to any that 
would otherwise occur. There are many approaches on the  additionality. The most 
recognized approach is that a JI or CDM project must be additional in emission limitation 
and reduction. The host side however emphasizes on the concept of financial additionality. 
Under JI, it is relatively easy to ensure the additionality, because host countries (the 
countries in transition) also commit to emission limitation and reduction and therefore 
should have established explicit reference. Under CDM, the additionality is particularly 
important and is difficult to be set up d efinitely, because at the current stage the host 
countries have not committed to any emission limitation and reduction obligation. 
Currently, the additionality remains as the mostly intractable problem with CDM. 
4.5.  Price elasticity 
Price elasticity may cause  negative effect on JI or CDM project as well. Less-developed 
and developing countries in general have compressed demands for energy consumption 
subject to budget constraints. These countries will expand their energy consumption once 
JI or CDM projects provide the cheap opportunity for the consumption, and therefore 
induce high level of emissions. Roland and Haugland (1994) review that Energidata survey 
in 1991 reported that the price-induced consumption increased 40% for households and 
10% for commerce in a  Norwegian investment support programme. They also incite 
Khazzoom’s (1986) finding that about 67% of the initial energy saving was eroded by the 
effect of price decrease in an econometric study of an American residential conservation 
programme. Roland and Haugland argue that consumption increase in response to price 
decrease could be as high as 100% in some specific cases. 
4.6.  Asymmetric information 
Several researches have stressed that asymmetric information on both investing and host 
countries may cause inefficiency of CDM. Roland and Haugland (1994) argue that if host 
country does not have emission targets, it has incentive to exaggerate its reduction 
potentials, and investing countries will follow to over-report emission reduction. Hagem 
(1995) finds that private information on cost and efficiency of the side of host country will 
undermine cost efficiency of CDM, as efficient rather than inefficient firms in the host will 
receive a positive rent. The result of the research however is partial, as it exams only the 
incentive of host country. Wirl et al. (1998) discusses the incentives of both sides, based 
on the private information on the host side,
12 and theoretically proves the argument by 
Roland and Haugland (1994). 
Wirl et al. further proposes a remedial way to reduce the inefficiency caused by 
asymmetry information. He suggests that investing countries should set up JI/CDM with 
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semi-efficient or similar countries (like Korean, Taiwan and Singapore). This approach 
apparently violates the cost efficiency of JI/CDM and seems rather implausible. The reason 
is that the semi-efficient countries also have high abatement costs, which may be close to 
the one of efficient or investing countries, and therefore have more room for cheating. 
Considering the costs besides t he project costs, it is almost impossible for developed 
countries to set up JI/CDM with the semi-developed countries. Therefore, the way to 
avoid the asymmetry inefficiency should be to invest in less efficient countries. In fact, the 
inefficiency caused b y asymmetric information is closely linked with the intensity of 
enforcement and therefore with the increase of transaction costs. Current practice has 
emphasised on the role of monitoring and verification in avoiding the potential cheating. 
There is a trade-off between inefficiency induced by cheating and monitoring and 
verification costs. As CDM are carried out at large scale in future, the monitoring and 
verification costs can be expected to decrease significantly and the problem of asymmetric 
information could be avoided. Current experience has not reported large cheating with AIJ 
projects. 
4.7.  Transaction costs 
Transaction costs appear whenever buyers and sellers encounter in marketplace to make 
transaction, and so do with any emissions trading scheme (Field, 1997; Montero, 1997). 
In general, the costs consist of search and information costs, negotiation costs, approval 
costs, monitoring and enforcement costs, and other types of costs (Stavins, 1995; Dudek 
and Wiener, 1996; Field, 1997). In general, transaction costs are not theoretically 
determinable, because the sources that generate the costs are complex and uncertain. 
Several authors assume transaction costs to be a function of traded permits and find that 
marginal transaction cost is a mark-up on permit  price (Kohn, 1991; Stavins, 1995; Kerr 
and Mare, 1997; Pan and Van Regemorter, 2001). However, transaction costs may be 
increasing, constant or decreasing scale to traded permits, depending on other factors. 
Practice also demonstrates that transaction costs exist in all emission trading programs, at 
the size of about 10% of total value of emissions trading (either the value of permit 
purchases or the value of permit sales plus other costs). According to Woerdman (2000), 
US lead phasedown program accounts 10% of total costs for transaction costs (Kerr and 
Mare, 1997). US SO2 emission trading scheme incurs transaction costs to be 8% of total 
cost (Montero, 1997). Brokerage fees in US Sulfur trading scheme are about 5% of total 
costs. Barrett (1994) identifies that transaction costs account around 10% of the project 
costs in the AIJ project between Norway as an investor, and Poland and Mexico as hosts. 
Other estimates of transaction costs based on experience of tradable emission permits in 
the USA put the transaction costs for inter-firm trade between 10 and 30% of the 
investment costs (Houcade and Baron, 1993, p 24). 
Transaction costs will erode the efficiency of emissions trading or even hinder the 
implementation of the instrument (Stavins, 1995). Historically, many precedent emissions 
trading systems have not been successful. One of the reasons was the higher transaction 
costs (Tietenberg, 1999). In emissions trading markets, transaction costs insert an 
additional cost to permit prices. The distortion on emissions trading markets induces 
multiplier effect on total costs of emission reduction. The higher price of emission trading Survey 
raised by transaction costs will force buyer to buy less and consequently seller to sell less, 
and therefore reach a new equilibrium that is less efficient than the one without 
transaction costs. As the result, overall induced economic inefficiency will multiply the 
transaction costs. Pan and Van Regemorter (2001) estimates that the multiplier is around 
1.3.  
Transaction costs take place  when information on emissions trading is incomplete. 
Nevertheless, efforts on acquiring the information will be helpful for the avoidance of 
transaction costs. The accumulation of experience in emission trading therefore could be 
one type of the efforts. W oerdman (2000) proposes a "learning" process to suppress 
transaction costs in JI/CDM projects. The Green Paper published by European Community 
(2000) advocates the Community's members to accumulate the experience on 
international emissions trading through  pre-action. Pan and Van Regemorter (2001) 
suppose that a pre-action before the Kyoto period could be helpful to reduce the 
transaction costs in emissions trading for the Kyoto compliance. They conclude that the 
efficiency of the "learning by doing" process is critical to clear up the transaction costs for 
the Kyoto compliance. 
Direct transaction costs may be afforded by buyer or seller or shared between the traders, 
depending on the negotiations. However, the indirect costs induced by transaction costs 
will fall most heavily on the higher cost controllers (Stavins 1995; Pan and Van 
Regemorter, 2001). At current stage of international negotiations, it seems that investing 
countries will eventually cover the direct transaction costs in CDM projects. 
4.8.  Market power 
There is debate on whether the markets of emissions trading are imperfect. When 
emissions trading is between nations, the markets may be influenced by market powers 
from both supply and demand sides, because in either side exist large nations. When 
emissions trading takes place among sources, the market power does not exist because 
potential large amount of sources will present on the markets (Zhang, 1998). The current 
stage of international negotiations on JI/CDM however shows that particularly in host side 
it is unlikely for host countries to allow project hosting at sources without any controls. 
Because a project that is beneficial to a hosting firm may not necessarily be beneficial to 
its nation. Therefore, market powers are considered in most of theoretical and empirical 
research. 
Market power may exist in both demand and supply side of JI/CDM. The less pressure an 
investing country faces in emissions reduction, the less it demands for emission permits, 
and the more market power it can exercise in pulling down the market price (Manne and 
Richels, 1999). On the other hand, a host country may tend to restrict its supply of 
JI/CDM for the following reasons. First, since developed countries take the leader in 
emission mitigation by the Kyoto Protocol,
13 it is very likely that developing countries will 
have to commit emission limitation and reduction targets sooner or latter after the Kyoto 
Protocol. In order to avoid the possibility that only expensive opportunities are left after 
the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries may strategically limit the supply of cheap 
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opportunities available to developed countries. For example, some developing countries 
may reserve the first cheapest opportunity and only sell the second cheapest opportunity. 
Second, in general an oversupply of the cheap opportunities will draw down the permit 
price and thus hurt supply countries’ welfare. Developing countries therefore have 
incentive to maintain a favourable price by controlling the quantity of supply. In particular, 
taking the possible hot air
14 into account, developing countries may hesitate supplying 
cheap opportunities, because the hot air problem could draw down the emission trade 
price to a very low level. 
4.9.  Baselines 
Baseline problem has drawn most concerns over CDM. There are alternative methods for 
setting up a baseline, namely a benchmark and a project-by-project approach. The former 
is a top-down method that sets up national, sector, or a group of project baselines and 
ensures compliance. The benchmark baseline is efficient for the compliance of emissions 
reduction targets by measuring the emissions reduction at macro-level. However, the latter 
sets up baseline on basis of single project. The project-by-project baseline is strong in 
monitoring and implementing emissions reduction project, but could be very costly due to 
transaction costs. Current trend is in favour of benchmark baseline with JI and project-by-
project baseline with CDM. Because the host countries in JI with the commitment on 
emissions reduction will measure the emissions at macro-levels and the host countries in 
CDM without any commitment may not establish emissions baseline at the levels. The 
emissions baseline with CDM therefore need be tailor-made with specific projects. A 
particular aspect, which have been p roposed by developing countries and denounced in 
the Kyoto Protocol, with CDM baseline is that the baseline should reflect the sustainable 
development in developing countries. Bollen, et al (1999) considered the capacity building 
in their research on CDM. 
5.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES 
Research on the application of the flexible mechanisms to the Kyoto Protocol become 
intensified thereafter the Protocol was launch in 1997. The Stanford Energy Modeling 
Forum (EMF) recently has reported comprehensive results on the economic impacts of the 
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. In this section, we review the EMF studies. In some 
occasions, we also refer to other researches. 
5.1.  The structures of the models and the baselines 
Weyant and Hill (1999) give a summarised review on the EMF studies. They divide the 
models used in the studies into five categories: 
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(a)  the aggregate production and cost model 
(b)  the energy sector detailed model 
(c)  the general equilibrium model 
(d)  the energy sector detailed general equilibrium model 
(e)  the macroeconomic econometric model 
The FUND and RICE are the aggregate production and cost model, which defines carbon-
equivalent energy input together with capital and labour into production function and 
captures changes in carbon intensity, production and cost in response to i ncreases in 
carbon prices. This type of models includes carbon trading and carbon emissions trading, 
but is unable to show inter-sector interactions and trade in commodity and service 
markets. The CETA, MERGE3 and GRAPE represent the energy sector detailed model. 
Except for the detailed descriptions on energy markets, sources and technologies, these 
models generally are similar with the first category in many aspects. The third category 
includes the MIT-EPPA, WorldScan and G-Cubed, which model the response of energy use 
to the changes in energy prices. This type of models incorporates classified economic 
sectors into a general equilibrium framework; thus is able to reflect inter-sector 
interactions and international trade in non-energy goods. The ABARE-GTEM, AIM, MS-
MRT and SGM are classified into the fourth category for that they are the combinations of 
the second and third categories. The fifth category, the Oxford macro-econometric model, 
specialises in testing macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, financial markets, 
international capital flows, and monetary policy. 
The carbon emission baseline projected by the studies varies greatly over a long period of 
about 100 years. In contrast, the near term from 1990 to 2010 shows less variety than 
the longer term after 2010 (Weyant and Hill 1999, figure 5 and 6). 
5.2.  The scenarios 
5.2.1.  The dimensions 
The EMF studies have run scenarios under some common assumptions; on the other hand, 
they also run other special scenarios separately. These studies in together provide a multi-
dimensional picture on the costs of emissions reduction in relation to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Summarily, these dimensions are as follows. On action types, besides carbon abatement, 
some researches estimate the potential costs of carbon sink action. On emission types 
defined in Annex  A of the Kyoto Protocol, not only carbon but also other carbon-
equivalent gases are studied. On emission reduction targets, some researches extend the 
Kyoto forever to long-term considerations such as the Kyoto followed by  arbitrary 
reductions,  the Kyoto followed by least-cost, the Least-cost, and below 550 ppm. On 
emission reduction periods, time intervals vary between 1990-2100. On economic 
indicators, carbon tax, GDP, consumption, and total costs are evaluated. Finally,  on 
trading schemes, all the researches examine three core situations and separately focus on 
a number of variants. Survey 
5.2.2.  The extreme cases 
The first core scenario is the case of No Trading, which assumes all Annex B  countries 
take full domestic abatement. It is believed that this case reveals an upper bound of the 
costs of the Kyoto Protocol. The second core scenario is another extreme case, which 
allows a Full Global Trading. With the case, it is possible for Annex  B countries to trade 
emission quotas each other and even to trade with non-Annex B countries, assuming non-
Annex B countries are allocated emission quotas at their existing level. In contrast to the 
first core scenario, the second scenario is supposed to describe a lower bound of the costs 
of the Kyoto Protocol. The third core scenario situates between the two extremes by 
considering only Annex  B  countries’ Trading. The costs estimated from this scenario 
apparently are between the upper and lower bounds. A variant of the third case is the 
case of Double Bubble, where EU takes abatement itself and other Annex B countries may 
trade each other. Because EU has relatively high abatement costs, the results of the 
Double Bubble would show an increase in EU’s costs and a decrease in other developed 
Annex B countries compared to the case of Annex B countries’ Trading only. 
5.2.3.  The restriction on sales 
Other variants of the core scenarios consider possible distortions on emissions trading.  
One of these distortions is market power. According to the Kyoto Protocol, former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe will be the sole seller of emission quotas under Annex I trading. 
Thus, this seller has great potential for exercising market power in influencing the trading 
price of emission quotas.  Bernstein et al.(1999) and MacCraken et al.  (1999) have 
examined the effects of potential monopoly power by the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. They identify the monopoly power by allowing the monopolist to maximize its 
welfare and quota sales profit respectively. In the case, the monopolist chooses the price 
of emission quota supply to maximize its welfare or profits that is the difference between 
its revenues from emission quota trading and its costs of domestic mitigation. In response 
to the price, the supply of emission quotas will be determined at a low level. Hence, the 
market power is identical to a limit on emission quota sales imposed by the potential seller 
or international authority. Manne and Richels (1999) examine the seller’s monopoly under 
the global trading. They find t hat if low-cost sellers are concentrated among a few 
countries, they may have considerable potential for extracting monopoly rents. 
Besides the market power, a restriction on emission quota sales possibly imposed by 
international agreement are studied in B ernstein et al. (1999), Bollen et al.  (1999) and 
MacCraken et al. (1999). Under Annex I trading, the restriction can be used to prevent 
potential hot air sales from the former Soviet Union. Bernstein et al. directly modeled the 
case of no hot air. In MacCraken et al., the allowed sales by the former Soviet Union are 
set to match its domestic abatement. The restriction also has important welfare 
distribution implications. Bernstein et al. compared the monopoly power with a case of 
30% restriction on emission quota sales imposed by international agreement. They 
conclude that the restriction will override the sales amount of emission quota under the 
monopoly case. As a result, the quota price will be higher than in the monopoly case, and 
will harm OECD countries. The negative effect on Annex I countries spills over to non-
Annex I countries and causes their welfare to be lower under the 30% case than the Survey 
monopoly case. Therefore, if a restriction on quota sales can not be set in consistent with 
a monopoly situation, it will produce lower welfare than the monopoly for all countries. 
Bollen et al. find that a 15% restriction on emission quota sales will cause the quota price 
to rise above the price level under the full Annex I trading. As the result, the monopolists 
will experience a term of trade gain, but they will suffer a 28% reduction in export 
compared to the full Annex I trading. On the other hand, some buyer countries will suffer 
a loss due to the higher marginal costs and greater domestic abatement. Interestingly, in 
the case, the US will become a seller of emission quotas as the quota price is higher than 
its domestic marginal abatement costs. 
5.2.4.  The restriction on purchase 
At demand side, a restriction is imposed on purchase, in response to the supplemental 
approach by the Kyoto Protocol that developed countries are allowed to use the flexible 
mechanisms only as a supplementary for their domestic mitigation. In Bernstein et al. 
(1999), a restriction on purchase may harm heavily the demanders that are urgently 
demanding for the emission quotas but may benefit the less urgently demanders. For 
example, in their 30% restriction scenario, Japan will suffer major loss while US and EU 
benefits are better than the case of unrestricted trading. The reason is that Japan has a 
relatively high marginal abatement costs and the restriction generates a trading price that 
is between the higher marginal costs in Japan and the lower marginal costs in EU and US. 
However, this situation will change with different restrictions imposed. Bollen, et al (1999) 
conclude that exporters of emission quotas will always suffer a terms of trade loss in the 
case of restriction on purchase both because less demands drive down the trading price 
and exports are reduced. 
5.2.5.  The CDM  
For that a full scale of global emissions trading may still have distance from 
implementation, a number of the researches run the scenario of CDM. However, the CDM 
can not be a perfect proxy for full global trading for the reasons we discussed in Section 
4. In the case, transaction costs, price elasticity, free riding and carbon leakage all could 
negatively affect the efficiency of CDM projects. Considering the difficulties associated 
with CDM, both Bernstein et al (1999) and Manne and Richels (1999) assume that a CDM 
can achieve at maximum only 15 percent of the total potential of cost efficiency through 
emissions trading. When combing Annex I trading and CDM, Bernstein finds that the CDM 
improves the welfare of Annex I countries very little compared to the case of Annex I 
trading, because the 15% restriction significantly limits non-Annex I countries’ 
engagement. Bollen et al (1999) consider the case of a combination of No Annex I trading 
and CDM for 5% of Annex I target. They find that the welfare improvements to Annex I 
countries are significant due to the CDM, but, surprisingly, the carbon emission is 
increased probably because of the existence of local energy markets. 
5.3.  The results 
The EMF Forum has explored the economic costs of the Kyoto Protocol and the related 
controls of climate change from multiple dimensions as briefly mentioned in last section. In Survey 
the present review, we will narrow down the results yielded from these researches by 
focusing on the carbon taxes of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010. We summary the carbon 
prices with a variety of situations in Table 1. This table has two-fold uses: showing the 
relevant costs and the scenario coverage. In the table, we also calculate the cost 
efficiency improvement across different trading scenarios with respect to US, Japan, EU, 
Canada, Australia, the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and Eastern Europe (EEU). Taking the 
example of MacCracken, US’s costs will decrease from no trading to 43% in Annex I 
Trading, to 38% in Double Bubble, and to 15% in a Full Global Trading. Japan’s costs will 
decrease to 16% in Annex I Trading, to 14% in Double Bubble, and to 6% in a Full Global 
Trading. EU’s costs will decrease to 56% in Annex I Trading, to 0% in Double Bubble 
(assuming EU countries takes domestic abatement individually), and to 20% in a Full 
Global Trading. The results by others show a similar trend. Figure 5.1 illustrates these 
changes. Clearly, Japan will be the largest winner, whereas EU can not benefit from the 
Double Bubble. 
The scenario analyses have provided many insights into the potentials of cost efficiency. 
We briefly draw some main conclusions from the EMF research as follows: 
With respect to the Kyoto Protocol, the EMF research reveals the upper and lower bounds 
of abatement costs. In general, a no trading case refers to the former, while a full global 
trading case refers to the latter. The no trading case could be very costly for developed 
countries, while the full global trading case would provide very cheap opportunities. 
Any case between the two extremes shall have the abatement costs or emissions trading 
prices in the interval between the upper and lower bounds. The more parties joint the 
international cooperation or the more flexibility is given to international cooperation, the 
more cost efficiency  
can be improved.  
Any distortions on the flexibility like market power, small clubs and supplementary 
restriction will have negative effect on the improvement of cost efficiency. However, some 
distortions will undermine the interest of developed countries, some will affect transitional 
or developing countries’ welfare negatively, and some may have both the effects. 
As the international cooperation expands, there are corresponding winners and losers, 
which implies that some parties are in favor of small range of trading or JI, some in favor 
of global trading or CDM. 




Carbon Taxes/Permit Prices for the Kyoto Protocol
1 2 3 4 5 6
The author Manne MacCracken Jacoby Nordhaus Kurosawa Bollen
The model MERGE3.0 SGM MIT-EPPA RICE GRAPE WorldScan
The price (1990 price) (1992 price) (1990 price) (1990 price) (1990 price) (1992 price)
1 1. Reference 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2. Full global trading (CDM) 70 26 17 42
3 2.1 Limit on purchases 140 3
4 US 39
5 EU 70
6 2.2 Limit on sales 145
7 2.3 Limit on both
8 3. The double bubble
9 Umbrella 64 16
10 EU 41
11 4. Full Annex I trading 73 76 57 66 20





17 4.2 Limit on sales 50
18 WEU -50
19 FSU -105 -50
20 EEU -105








29 5. No emissions trading




34 WEU 130 82
35 FSU 0
36 EEU 0
US Annex I Trading / No Trading 0% 43% 39% 45% 45%
Double Bubble / No Trading 0% 38% 36%
Global Trading / No Trading 29% 15% 13%
JapanAnnex I Trading / No Trading 16%
Double Bubble / No Trading 14%
Global Trading / No Trading 6%
EU Annex I Trading / No Trading 56% 24%
Double Bubble / No Trading 100% 50%
Global Trading / No Trading 20%
* "s" shared value
* "-" seller's price
* "()" hot air case  
 Survey 
 
Carbon Taxes/Permit Prices for the Kyoto Protocol
7 8 9 10 11
The author Kainuma Bernstein Tulpule McKibbin Cooper
The model AIM MS-MRT GTEM G-Cubed CETA-M
The price (1992 price) (1995 price) (1992 price) (1995 price) (1997 price)
1 1. Reference 0 0 0 0 0
2 2. Full global trading (CDM) 38 31 23
3 2.1 Limit on purchases 79
4 US
5 EU
6 2.2 Limit on sales
7 2.3 Limit on both
8 3. The double bubble
9 Umbrella 45 108 32 170
10 EU 195 176 263 932
11 4. Full Annex I trading 65 90 114 (97) 61 222

















29 5. No emissions trading
30 US 150 275 346 80 407
31 JAPAN 240 468 693 112 1067
32 CANADA 175 249s 835 261 1261
33 AUSTRALIA 95 249s 455 181
34 WEU 195 209 714 263 932
35 FSU 0 0 0
36 EEU 0 40
US Annex I Trading / No Trading 43% 33% 76% 55%
Double Bubble / No Trading 30% 31% 40% 42%
Global Trading / No Trading 25% 11% 29%
Japan Annex I Trading / No Trading 27% 19% 54% 21%
Double Bubble / No Trading 19% 16% 29% 16%
Global Trading / No Trading 16% 7% 21%
EU Annex I Trading / No Trading 33% 43% 23% 24%
Double Bubble / No Trading 100% 25% 100% 100%
Global Trading / No Trading 19% 15% 9%
* "s" shared value
* "-" seller's price
* "()" hot air case  Survey 
6.  FURTHER EXPLORATIONS 
The EMF studies and others remain gaps with the exploration of JI/CDM potentials. On the 
one hand, the existing conclusions may be to some extent incomprehensive and partial, 
depending heavily on assumptions made in different scenarios. On the other hand, the 
existing studies have not worked in sufficient details on modeling JI/CDM. In most cases, 
they simply or implicitly assume that JI/CDM are identical to some percentage restriction 
of emissions trading, and hence substitute the simulations of JI/CDM with the restricted 
emissions trading. 
The gaps remain with existing research see to suggest that modeling JI/CDM should go 
into three dimensions: the nations joining JI/CDM, the sectors providing possibility for 
JI/CDM, and the factors affecting efficiencies of JI/CDM. Firstly, JI and CDM are the 
special forms of emissions trading between any combinations of nations within Annex I 
region and within global region, respectively. In the sense, the Double Bubble can be 
regarded as an example of one case of JI. There could be many other combinations of 
nations within Annex I region and within global region. These combinations can also be 
regarded as JI and CDM cases. All of these combinations constitute the potential for JI 
and CDM. The differences in cost between the JI/CDM potentials and the ET within Annex 
I region and within global trading also reveal the inefficiency of JI/CDM to ET. Secondly, 
modeling JI and CDM should be sector-specific, as different sectors may have different 
possibilities for JI and CDM. On the other hand, ET implies that each sector h as same 
possibility for JI and CDM. It is argued practically that the possibility of JI and CDM will 
mostly exist in few sectors such as agriculture, energy, electricity sectors. Finally, 
modelling JI and CDM should consider the potential factors, which we have discussed in 
Section 4, eroding the efficiency of JI and CDM projects. To overcome the problem 
therefore motivates research to simulate various measures that will improve the efficiency 
of JI and CDM projects. 
Summarily, figure 3 illustrates the potential improvement of cost efficiency in the case of 
JI. Similar arguments are applicable to CDM. The area 1+2+3+4 indicates the maximal 
costs for a 5% emission reduction, while the area 1 represents the minimal costs. The 
area 2+3+4 is total cost efficiency to be achieved by the ET in Annex I region. If ET is 
not available within the Annex I region, JI is possible, and JI projects can be implemented 
efficiently, the JI then can improve the cost efficiency of area 3+4 from no trading. The 
area also indicates the cost efficiency due to the JI, resulted from the transfer of part of 
emissions reduction target from high-cost to low-cost countries. Otherwise, if JI projects 
cannot be implemented efficiently, it can improve cost efficiency of area 4 at maximum 
from no trading, the inefficient implementation of JI projects erodes part of total cost 
efficiency of JI
15. The area 3 therefore represents the potential loss in efficiency. Finally, 
the area 2 specifies the efficiency loss of JI compared to ET owing to the limited 
possibility in sectors. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Here, the inefficiency of JI implies both cost and environmental inefficiency. In the case of environmental 
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